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Abstract
In this paper we reconsider the concept of Berge equilibrium. In a recent work,
[Colman, A. M., Körner, T., Musy, O. and Tazdaït, T. [2011] Mutual support in games:
Some properties of Berge equilibria, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 55, 166–175].
proposed a correspondence for two-player games between Berge and Nash equilibria by
permutation of the utility functions. We define here more general transformations of
games that lead to a correspondence with Berge and Nash equilibria and characterize
all such transformations.
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1 Introduction
A burgeoning literature has focused on the Berge-Vaisman equilibrium (Abalo and Kostreva
(2004, 2005); Colman et al. (2011); Courtois et al. (2011); Larbani and Nessah (2008); Musy
et al. (2012); Nessah et al. (2007)). This concept captures the mutual support behavior in
the normal form games. Furthermore, it is not a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. It
thus fills a gap in the non-cooperative game theory.
Among different results that have been highlighted, there is one that will particularly
come under scrutiny in this paper. Colman et al. (2011) established a correspondence
between Berge-Vaisman and Nash equilibria. These authors show that the set of Berge-
Vaisman equilibria of a two-player game is the set of Nash equilibria obtained by permu-
tation of the utility functions of both players. In general, such a transformation may be
feasible for one game, but it is then specific of the game. The aim of this paper is to
examine whether there exists a general transformation of Berge-Vaisman equilibrium in
terms of Nash equilibrium that could be valid not for one specific game, but for all games.
Accordingly, we give all the possible transformations for two-player games. We also show
that for n-player games, with n > 2, there is no transformation that links Berge-Vaisman
and Nash equilibria.
That a transformation between Nash and Berge-Vaisman equilibria may exist is not
a fantasy from the authors. The concept of Berge-Vaisman equilibrium is sometimes dis-
missed, on the basis that it is simply Nash equilibrium “up to a transformation”. The
confusion may have arisen because in the most studied two-player case such a transforma-
tion exists. We clear away this confusion. When one is acquainted with Berge-Vaisman
equilibrium, it is not surprising that a “transformation” does not exist. Together with
precise definitions, we provide here a comprehensive proof of this fact.
2 Berge-Vaisman Equilibrium and General Transformation
Consider the following non cooperative game in normal form:
G = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉, (1)
where I = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players (with n ≥ 2), Si the non-empty strategy
set of player i, and ui her utility function. This utility function ui : S → R is defined
on S =
∏
i∈I Si, where S is the set of all strategy profiles and s−i is the strategy profile
(s1, . . . si−1, si+1 . . . sn) ∈ S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj . We start with the definition of Nash and Berge-
Vaisman equilibria.
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Definition 1 (Nash (1950)) A feasible strategy profile s ∈ S is said to be a Nash equilib-
rium of the game G if, for any player i ∈ I, and any si ∈ Si, we have:
ui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(s).
A Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy profile in which no agent, taking the strate-
gies of the other players as given, wishes to change her strategy choice.
Definition 2 (Zhukovskii (1985)) A feasible strategy profile s ∈ S is a Berge-Vaisman
equilibrium of the game G if, for any player i ∈ I, and any s−i ∈ S−i, we have:
ui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(s).
This definition means that, when a player i ∈ I plays her strategy si from the Berge-
Vaisman equilibrium s, she obtains her higher utility when the remaining players willingly
play the strategy s−i from the Berge-Vaisman equilibrium.
These two equilibria are very different from one another. Yet, Colman et al. (2011)
found a correspondence between the two equilibrium concepts. By linking the game G =
〈{1, 2}, (S1, S2), (u1, u2)〉 to the game G˜ = 〈{1, 2}, (S1, S2), (v1, v2)〉 with v1 = u2 and v2 =
u1, these authors proved the following theorem1.
Theorem 1 (Colman et al. (2011)) A strategy profile s ∈ S is a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium
of the game G if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the game G˜.
We recall here the proof of this theorem for sake of self-consistency.
Proof. This is a simple play with the definition, noting that S−1 = S2 and S−2 = S1.
Suppose s∗ is a Berge equilibrium of the game G. Then, by definition,
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤ ui(s∗),∀ i ∈ N, ∀ s−i ∈ S−i,
That is to say u1(s∗1, s2) ≤ u1(s∗), ∀ s2 ∈ S2 and u2(s1, s∗2) ≤ u2(s∗), ∀ s1 ∈ S1.
Since u1 = v2 and u2 = v1, v1(s1, s∗2) ≤ v1(s∗), ∀ s1 ∈ S1 and v2(s∗1, s2) ≤ v2(s∗), ∀ s2 ∈
S2. Therefore
vi(si, s
∗
−i) ≤ vi(s∗), ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ si ∈ Si
It follows that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game G˜. The converse that if s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium in G˜, then it is a Berge equilibrium in G is proved in the same way, and the
required result follows.
To propose a more general result, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3 Let F : Rn → Rn be a function, F is a transformation of the Berge-Vaisman
equilibrium concept to the Nash equilibrium concept, if for all n-player games, the set of
Berge-Vaisman equilibrium of the game
G = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉,
is the same as the set of Nash equilibrium in the transformed game
F (G) = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (F (u)i)i∈I〉,
where the utility of player i is Fi(u1, . . . , un).
1Note that Larbani and Nessah (2008) identified another type of link. In particular, they showed that
a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium can also be a Nash equilibrium under certain conditions.
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We call such an F simply an n-transformation. The game F (G) is called the trans-
formed game of G. We can formulate the theorem of Colman et al. (2011) with this
definition.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1 restated) The function F (x, y) = (y, x) is a 2-transformation.
The paper now characterizes all the n-transformations. We begin with a general lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that F is an n-transformation (n ≥ 2), then Fi does not depend on ui.
Proof. We want to prove that for all u−i ∈ Rn−1, Fi is constant in ui. By symmetry,
we put i = 1. Suppose our lemma is false, then there exist u−1 and u1, u′1 ∈ R, such
that F1(u1, u−1) 6= F1(u′1, u−1). Then we define the n-player game by the strategy set
S1 = {s1, s′1} and S−1 = {s−1}, and the utilities u1(s1, s−1) = u1, u1(s′1, s−1) = u′1 and
u−1(s1, s−1) = u−1, u−1(s′1, s−1) = u−1. The two strategy profiles of this game are Berge-
Vaisman equilibria, however the transformed game has just one Nash equilibrium (it is
(s1, s−1) if F1(u1, u−1) > F1(u′1, u−1), (s′1, s−1) if F1(u1, u−1) < F1(u′1, u−1)). This is a
contradiction with the assumption that F is a transformation.
2.1 The case n = 2
Now we restrict ourselves to the case n = 2. According to the lemma, the transformation
F takes the form F (u1, u2) = (F1(u2), F2(u1)).
Lemma 2 Suppose that F is a 2-transformation, then F1 is a strictly increasing function
of u2.
Proof. Suppose it is not the case. Then, there exist u2, u′2 ∈ R such that u2 < u′2 but
F1(u2) ≥ F1(u′2). Consider the 2-player game defined by the strategy set S1 = {s1, s′1} and
S2 = {s2}, and the utility u1(s1, s2) = u1, u1(s′1, s2) = u1 and u2(s1, s2) = u2, u2(s′1, s2) =
u′2, where u1 is any real number. The strategy profile (s′1, s2) is the unique Berge-Vaisman
equilibrium, whereas in the transformed game (s1, s2) is a Nash equilibrium (it is unique
if F1(u2) > F1(u′2), if F1(u2) = F1(u′2), then (s′1, s2) is also a Nash equilibrium). This
contradicts the assumption that F is a transformation, i.e. that Nash equilibria of the
transformed game are exactly the Berge-Vaisman equilibria of the original game.
Theorem 3 All the 2-transformations have the form F (u1, u2) = (F1(u2), F2(u1)), where
F1 and F2 are strictly increasing functions.
Proof. From the lemma 2, by symmetry, we have also proven that F2 is a strictly increasing
function of u1. So the conditions of the theorem are necessary for F to be a transformation.
To prove that they are also sufficient, we proceed in two steps. By theorem 1, permuting
the utility function of the two players is a 2-transformation. Then changing the utility of
each player by increasing functions does not change the set of equilibria. So the functions
with the form specified in the theorem are indeed transformations.
For two-player games, the concept of Berge-Vaisman equilibrium is reducible to the
concept of Nash equilibrium, given that the utilities of the players be redefined. The above
theorem precisely specifies the set of transformations for two-player games. Let us now
move to the case where the number of players is greater than 2.
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2.2 The case n > 2
Let F be an n-transformation. We have already proven that Fi does not depend on ui.
We proceed to the reductio ad absurdum process by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that F is an n-transformation. Then F1 does not depend on u2.
Proof. Assuming the lemma is not valid, there exists u−2, u2, u′2 ∈ R, such that F1(u2, u−2) 6=
F1(u
′
2, u−2). We split u−2 in (u1, u−1,−2) so that u−1,−2 ∈ Rn−2 (if n = 3, this is just
u3). Consider the n-player game defined by the strategy set S1 = {s1}, S2 = {s2},
and S−1,−2 = {s−1,−2, s′−1,−2}. The utilities for players other than 2 are constant u1 =
u1, u−1,−2 = u−1,−2, but for player 2 u2(s1, s2, s−1,−2) = u2, u2(s1, s2, s′−1,−2) = u′2. Note
that the definition of u2 is valid precisely because n > 2. In the transformed game, the
two strategy profiles (s1, s2, s−1,−2) and (s1, s2, s′−1,−2) are Nash equilibria, whereas in the
initial game, only one strategy profile is a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium (it is (s1, s2, s−1,−2)
if u2 > u′2). This contradicts our general assumption that F is a transformation and proves
the lemma.
We are now ready to show that an n-transformation cannot exist if n > 2.
Theorem 4 No n-transformation exists when n > 2.
Proof. In the proof of the previous lemma, the place of 2 was irrelevant, the only important
thing was that there exists at least a third player (distinct from 1 and 2). So actually F1
does not depend on any ui for all i (recall our previous lemma). But it is irrelevant whether
it is 1 or another player (the proof is the same if one replaces 1 by i and 2 by j). So we
have the result that F is constant. But a constant cannot be a transformation, because
there are games where not all strategy profiles are Berge-Vaisman equilibria (e.g. the game
constructed in the proof of lemma 3).
3 Illustration Example
A key ingredient of the proof is the requirement of the transformation to be universable.
If this condition is relaxed, a transformation may exist, as the example will show.
Example 1 Consider the following n-players (assume that n > 2) on the unit square
Si = [0, 1], for each i ∈ I = {1, ..., n}. For player i ∈ I and s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S = [0, 1]n,
the payoff functions are:
ui(s) =
n∑
j=1
ai,jsj ,
where ai,j is constant in R, for each i, j ∈ I. This game is bounded, compact, convex,
continuous and quasiconcave.
For each player i ∈ I, denote by I−j all players rather than player j (I−j = {1, . . . , j −
1, j + 1, . . . , n}). The following proposition characterizes the existence of Berge-Vaisman
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The considered game possesses a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium if and only
if for each j ∈ I, sign(ai,j) = sign(ah,j), 2 for each i, h ∈ I−j.
2sign(x) =
{
+ if x ≥ 0
− if x ≤ 0.
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Proof. Let s ∈ S be a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium of the game. Fix any j ∈ I, and let
i ∈ I−j . Since s is a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium, then
ui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(s), for each s−i ∈ S−i
Let s−i = (sj , s−{i,j}) for any sj ∈ Sj . This is possible, since j 6= i. Thus,
ai,jsj ≤ ai,jsj , for each sj ∈ Sj and i 6= j
If ai,j > 0, then necessarily sj = 1. If ai,j < 0, then necessarily sj = 0. If ai,j = 0, there
is no condition on sj . Obviously, sj does not depend on i ∈ I−j ,, therefore sign(ai,j) =
sign(ah,j), for each i, h ∈ I−j .
Conversely, suppose the conditions holds, then for j ∈ I define sj to the (common)
sign of the ai,j , i ∈ I−j (i.e. 0 is at least one of the ai,j is negative, 1 if at least one is
positive, any number in Sj if all are null). Then the strategy profile s is a Berge-Vaisman
equilibrium of the game.
This fully characterizes the Berge-Vaisman equilibria of the game with linear utilities.
We now do the same for the Nash equilibria.
Proposition 2 1) The game 〈I, S, (ui)i∈I〉 possesses an unique Nash equilibrium if and
only if for each i ∈ I, ai,i 6= 0.
2) The game 〈I, S, (ui)i∈I〉 possesses an infinity number of Nash equilibria if and only if
there exists i0 ∈ I, so that ai0,i0 = 0.
Proof. Since the game 〈I, S, (ui)i∈I〉 is compact, convex, continuous and quasiconcave,
then it has a Nash equilibrium. Let s ∈ S be a Nash equilibrium of the game. Then for
each i, and for each si ∈ Si, we have ui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(s). By linearity of ui, we obtain then
ai,isi ≤ ai,isi, for each i ∈ I.
If ai,i > 0, this is possible only if si = 1; if ai,i < 0, this is possible only if si = 0. If ai,i = 0,
there is no condition on si.
Conversely, define si according to the sign of ai,i (i.e. si = 1 when ai,i > 0; si = 0 when
ai,i < 0; any si ∈ Si when ai,i = 0). Then the strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium.
We can now give two examples of a transformation between Berge-Vaisman and Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Consider the class of all games with linear utilities, such that for each
j ∈ I, for i, h ∈ I−j sign(ai,j) = sign(ah,j). Restricts further the class to the game such
that ai,i has the same sign of ah,i, h 6= i, in a strict sense, that is ai,i is positive (resp.
negative) if at least one ah,i, h 6= i is positive (resp. negative), ai,i is null if all ah,i, h 6= i
are null. The identity is a transformation on this class.
Proof. The first condition ensures by Proposition 1 that a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium
exists. The second condition ensures that Nash and Berge-Vaisman equilibrium are the
same by the characterization of equilibrium strategy profiles of Propositions 1-2. So the
identity is a transformation of game.
Let call F the function that maps a vector x ∈ Rn to the diagonal vector of the sum of
its components.
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Proposition 4 Consider the class of all games with linear utilities, such that for each
j ∈ I, for i, h ∈ I−j sign(ai,j) = sign(ah,j) and (
∑
i ai,j)
(∑
i 6=j ai,j
)
> 0. Then F is a
transformation on this class of games.
Proof. Take a game G in the class. By the conditions that all signs of coefficients (off the
diagonal) of a column are the same, there is a Berge-Vaisman equilibrium. This equilibrium
is unique for not all the coefficients are null by the extra-condition. By Proposition 1, the
Berge-Vaisman strategy profile is uniquely determined by the sign of the columns. The
transformed game F (G) still has linear utilities, with coefficients bj,j =
∑
i ai,j . The extra-
condition (
∑
i ai,j)
(∑
i 6=j ai,j
)
> 0 ensures that bj,j has the same sign of the column j of
the original game. So the Nash equilibrium of the transformed game is the same as the
Berge-Vaisman equilibrium of the original game.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have characterized all the transformation of games between Nash and
Berge-Vaisman equilibria. For 2-player games, Berge-Vaisman equilibrium is linked to
Nash equilibrium by a permutation of utilities pertaining to changing utilities by strictly
increasing functions. For n-player games, with n > 2, the concept of Berge-Vaisman equi-
librium is not transformable to the concept of Nash equilibrium by redefining the utilities
of the players. This result stimulates further research on Berge-Vaisman equilibrium when
there are more than two players.
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